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✉ E-mail: ThomasL62@cf.ac.ukAbstract: An electricity supply smart contract was developed and demonstrated to perform pre-time-of-use price
negotiation between demand and generation and post-time-of-use settlement and payment. The smart contract was
demonstrated with 1000 loads/generators with usages simulated using lognormal probability distributions. It combines
payment of deposit, negotiation of price based on estimates, settlement based on actual usage and enactment of
payments using crypto-currency. The settlement procedure rewards customers that adjusted to balance the system.
The smart contract was written in the solidity programming language and implemented with a simulated Ethereum
blockchain using testrpc and go-ethereum. In the example test case, a price was agreed, settled and payment enacted.1 Introduction
Automation of the energy supply role in the GB power system will
become possible due to the increasing feasibility of smart contracts
and the increase in digital metering across the power system. On
the GB system, energy suppliers act as the interface between
consumers and generators. They are free to negotiate prices with
generators and compete for customers with other suppliers. The
bulk of the demand–supply balance is achieved through these
negotiations, with the remaining short-term imbalance managed by
the system operator through the balancing mechanism. Through
demonstration of automated negotiation, settlement and payment,
with reward for system balancing, this work shows the potential
for blockchain-based smart contracts to undertake the supplier role.
The intent of the supplier’s role, established during the market
liberalisation of the 1980s and 1990s, is that those suppliers
offering the most competitive offers (in terms of price and/or
generation mix) will tend to survive. However, an investigation
found that a relatively low proportion of consumers change
suppliers or negotiate (∼70% of domestic customers stay on
default tariffs) [1]. There is, therefore, desire to improve the
system. The advent of implementable smart contracts may give
governments and regulators opportunity to reduce overall system
costs and ensure competitiveness.
Smart contracts are rules for information exchange that have a
common mechanism for deﬁnition and enactment. They were
described by Szabo in 1994 [2], who later envisaged a mutually
trusted virtual computer upon which smart contracts could run [3].
Implementations of such virtual computers using modern cryptography
are commonly associated with the label ‘blockchain technology’.
Blockchains are data structures (blocks) with cryptographic links
from the present state to the preceding state. When changes are made
to a block in accordance with a set of rules, a new block is created.
Each new block must also contain a cryptographic hash of the
previous block. This creates a continuously growing chain of
blocks. In many public blockchains, the latest block is agreed
upon using proof of work or proof of stake consensus algorithms.
The growth of blockchain technology for cryptocurrency is well
documented [4]. Recent advances go further in allowing
transactions to deﬁne smart contracts. One example, Ethereum,
includes a blockchain-based 256 bit virtual computer [5] – this
allows ﬂexibility in how smart contracts are deﬁned.CIRED, Open Access Proc. J., 2017, Vol. 2017, Iss. 1, pp. 2619–2623
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Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)There is worldwide research and implementation activity, including
many start-up companies [6–13], in the area of blockchain-based
smart contracts for energy systems. Aitzhan and Svetinovic describe
a token-based peer-to-peer system for anonymous negotiation of
energy prices [14] and Horta et al. describe work underway on a
blockchain-based distributed energy market test system [15].
LO3Energy’s Brooklyn microgrid project [16] has demonstrated the
interaction of electricity metering with a blockchain-based smart
contract and Ponton claimed the ﬁrst blockchain-based energy trade
in Europe [8]. SolarCoin is a token for reward of solar electricity
generation, the token is created when meters (registered with the
SolarCoin Foundation) record solar electricity generation [17].2 Method
2.1 Example supplier smart contract
A simple supplier smart contract was implemented on the Ethereum
blockchain platform, using a private test net. It shows how a set of
rules for a price negotiation and settlement, in which all connected
users (demand and generation) have half hourly metering, are
deﬁned and enacted. The contract process is shown in Figs. 1 and 2.
Users (load/generator connections) are classiﬁed as critical or
non-critical. Critical users are those who must not be disconnected
and play no role in price negotiation. Non-critical users submit
offers (either generation or demand) in Wh with minimum price
threshold for the next hour’s usage and only operate if their offer
is accepted. Two mappings of demand offers and generation offers
are created, both referenced by offer price.
All critical users submit a predicted usage in Wh for the hour
ahead to the contract. Losses are estimated by the network
operator (simpliﬁed to a single entity). A system wide demand/
generation imbalance ﬁgure is calculated by the contract. If there
is excess demand, generation offers are accepted (in order of
lowest offer price to highest) until there is excess generation.
Conversely, if there is excess generation, demand offers are
accepted in order of lowest to highest) until there is excess
demand. The contract sends the revised imbalance estimate to the
network operator. The accepted non-critical users are paid at their
offered price and the accepted offers are used to determine the
energy price for the critical users – see ﬁnal box in Fig. 1.2619Commons
Fig. 2 Process for settlement phase of supplier smart contractFig. 1 Process for negotiation phase of supplier smart contractAfter usage, there is a settlement stage. All users submit
their actual metered usage in Wh to the contract. Critical
users pay the market price for their usage. Where users meet
their estimate they are rewarded. Where they differ fromCI
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emergency generation reserve and the user had reduced
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imbalance they are penalised. The reward payment is calculated
according to
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where Ruser is the calculated reward for a given user, Huser is a
historical performance factor between 0 and 1, Euser is a users’
estimated usage, Auser is a users’ actual usage and U is the set
of all users.
After all of the rewards have been calculated, the sum of all
rewards is used to attribute penalties to the relevant accounts
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where Puser is the calculated penalty for a given user.
This formulation means users that adjust to balance
demand-generation on the system are paid by those that unbalance
it. The historical performance factor, Huser, reduces the potential
for gaming of the formula through submission of inaccurate
estimates.
The smart contract code was written in the solidity programming
language [18]. The contract uses the default value token of the
Ethereum platform, the Ether – ETH. To participate, users must
maintain a deposit from which their usage payment is taken (or
into which they are paid).Fig. 3 Distributions of 400 LV load and 400 LV (top), 45 MV load and 45 MV
generator (middle), ﬁve HV load and ﬁve HV generator estimates (bottom)
Table 2 Characteristics of smart contract participant load and
generation – offers from non-critical users
Description No. Offered price distribution
function parameters
(mean, sigma, multiplier)
Offered volume
distribution function
parameters (mean,
sigma, multiplier)
LV
generators
50 1, 1, 10 1, 1, −1
MV
generators
40 1, 1, 10 1, 1, −1,000,000
HV
generators
10 1, 1, 10 1, 1, −100,000,0002.2 Supplier smart contract test case – negotiation
To test the example smart contract 1000 user accounts were
generated with a private blockchain simulation created with
testrpc. The ﬁrst 900 of the users were partitioned into 800
low-voltage (LV) users, 90 medium-voltage (MV) and 10
high-voltage (HV). They were designated as critical and their
estimated demand and generation usages where created using
Numpy’s [19], lognormal function with parameters shown in
Table 1. The resulting distributions are shown in Fig. 3.
For the remaining 100 users, designated as non-critical, generation
offers were made with lognormal function parameters shown in
Table 2. The ETH values depicted are not tied to existing Great
British Pound (GBP) to ETH exchange rates. The 50 LV generator
offers and prices are shown in Fig. 4.
The estimates for the 900 critical users and the offers from the 100
non-critical users were submitted to the smart contract on the testrpc
Ethereum blockchain and the price setting function was called using
go-ethereum. Estimated losses of 200 MWh were submitted by a
designated network operator account.Table 1 Characteristics of smart contract critical user load and
generation estimates
Description Number Probability distribution function parameters
(mean, sigma, multiplier)
LV loads 400 1, 1, 1
LV
generators
400 1, 1, −0.9
MV loads 45 1, 1, 1,000,000
MV
generators
45 1, 1, −900,000
HV loads 5 1, 1, 100,000,000
HV
generators
5 1, 1, −100,000,000
Fig. 4 Distribution of LV generation offers volume and price offers
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Table 3 Adaptations of critical user LV and MV estimates to give
simulated actual uses
Description Number Multiplier function parameters (loc, scale)
LV loads 400 1, 0.1
LV generators 400 1, 0.1
MV loads 45 1.01
MV generators 45 1.012.3 Supplier smart contract test case – settlement
Actual usage readings were simulated by multiplying the
arrays of original estimates by normal distributions created
by NumPy’s normal function, with parameters as shown in
Table 3. The HV generation and demand values were left
unchanged as were all of the accepted non-critical users.
Adjusted nominal losses of 190 MWh were submitted by a
designated network operator account. The user accounts
each submitted an actual usage reading to the smart contract.
Those generators with accepted offers also submitted their usage
values. Notional use of system (UoS) charges was set at 1 ETH
per user.3 Results
3.1 Negotiation
Once all estimates and offers were received by the smart
contract, the market price setting function ran as described in
Fig. 1. This resulted in the acceptance of 71 offers from the
non-critical generators and a market price of 9 ETH/kWh for
critical users.3.2 Settlement
The settlement procedure ran as described in Fig. 2. The price paid
per kWh for each user is shown in Fig. 5 (note the UoS charge is not
included). In this test case as demand exceeded, generation in the
negotiation phase, generation is paid (positive) and demand is
charged. The variability in prices paid by the LV users is due to
the increased spread of estimation error (Table 3) and the reward/
penalty being attributed per Wh of error (Equations 1 and 2). The
mean price received by LV generators is 7.1 ETH/kWh with a
range from 10.9 to 2.0 ETH/kWh. The mean price paid by LV
loads is 10.7 ETH/kWh with a range from 19.3 to 7.0 ETH/kWh.
The mismatch between the load and generation prices is in part
due to the losses (the notional UoS charge was excluded from
these ﬁgures).Fig. 5 Price per unit energy for each load/generator
CI
2622 This is an open4 Discussion
At present, owing to the proof of work consensus algorithm used by
the Ethereum blockchain (and others), any computation performed
by the blockchain-based smart contract is expensive compared to
the same computation performed by a single computer. Whilst
proposals to improve efﬁciency exist, and are planned, careful
consideration must be given to what computation is done by a
contract and what is done outside – whilst perhaps retaining a
cryptographic root in the contract.
The next stage of this work is to create a set of tiered smart
contracts, tied to the topology of the power network, such that
there is clear competition for all services provided to customers
including provision for system running costs (e.g. losses, stability,
and protection), provision of import/export capacity as well as
certainty of future availability (e.g. planning and maintenance)
whilst not requiring active consumer engagement. The aim is to
demonstrate a system that provides clear pricing signals to
potential innovators and investors at all levels.5 Conclusions
An energy supplier smart contract for automated negotiation,
settlement and payment, with reward for system balancing support
was demonstrated. This indicates potential for blockchain-based
smart contracts to perform a supply role on the GB power system.
The demonstrated smart contract includes reward for adjusting
demand towards system balance with payments taken from those
who adjusted away from system balance. In the example test case,
a price was agreed, settled and payment enacted.
Energy supply companies can be viewed as competing sets of
demand-generation negotiation rules. There is opportunity for
suppliers to encode these rules as smart contracts. Consequently,
there is a challenge to system regulators to arrange system
information ﬂows from metering (at all voltage levels) to smart
contracts in such a way that efﬁcacy of competition is maximised.6 Acknowledgments
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